[CAVO] Fwd: [VVSG-election] [VVSG-interoperability] By November, Russian hackers could target voting machines

[DrM]

The VVPAT on a continuous roll was NEVER what I and others had intended 
as an implementation of Voter Verified Paper Ballots (VVPB). The 
continuous roll leaves open the possibility of vote-selling and exposure 
of the ballot contents because the order of the voters as they enter the 
polling booth can be recorded and later synchronized to be revealed. 
There have also been problems with the paper rolls jamming and ripping, 
and there is also an electronic tally that can be used in lieu of the 
paper. This is the same with the paper sheets. Typically the paper is 
NEVER counted nor used for recounts.

My concept of the VVPB uses the paper as the ACTUAL ballot. Namely, the 
ballot that the voter sees and VERIFIES with an affirmative action, is 
the TRUE ballot to be used for vote tabulation and also for purposes of 
recounts. For example, hand-prepared ballots that are publicly 
hand-tabulated, such as in the UK, would qualify as VVPBs. Hand marked 
paper ballots that are optically scanned are typically never 
hand-tabulated, and in some regions (such as Florida) their 
hand-tabulation is PROHIBITED by law. Some states, though, do provide 
for a hand recount of paper ballots that the voters prepared or verified 
at the time of voting, and that would be OK in my opinion.

The positions of various academic proponents of different balloting 
systems has tended to change over the years. Some also allow for 
cryptographic voting, which they refer to as voter "verifiable" which I 
also find unacceptable, since the voter really cannot verify the 
mathematical implementations directly.

For additional information about electronic voting, its inherent 
problems, and my positions and writing, see the many papers and articles 
on my website at www.notablesoftware.com/evote.html

Good luck trying to sort it all out,
Rebecca Mercuri, Ph.D.




On 7/28/2016 12:55 PM, Brent Turner wrote:
> Right- O--
>
> Conversations with Felton have shown he is aligned with the security 
> community in recognizing VVPAT as a failed / botched concept..
>
> Dr. Mercuri can chime in but my understanding is Dill stole her design 
> and failed to execute it properly..
>
> Perhaps it would be better with OS code..  Rebecca ?
>
> On Thu, Jul 28, 2016 at 9:42 AM, Gilbert,Juan E <juan at ufl.edu 
> <mailto:juan at ufl.edu>> wrote:
>
>     This isn't a VVPAT demo. He didn't discuss VVPATs in this
>     demonstration. The tally results were printed on a thermal roll,
>     but that's not a VVPAT.
>
>
>     Thanks,
>
>
>     On 7/28/16 11:18 AM, Brent Turner wrote:
>>     https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HBqGzgxcfAk
>>
>>     On Thu, Jul 28, 2016 at 7:29 AM, Gilbert,Juan E <juan at ufl.edu
>>     <mailto:juan at ufl.edu>> wrote:
>>
>>         Brent, you said,
>>
>>         Currently the " secret software  " systems coupled with
>>         VVPAT's are
>>         condemned as insecure by government study, so we don't have
>>         to consider
>>         the internet to sound those alarms. Ed Felton from OSTP confirms.
>>
>>
>>         Can you point me to those articles? I agree VVPAT's have
>>         issues. Just to
>>         be clear, VVPATs are ballots printed on a continuous thermal
>>         paper roll.
>>         However, ES&S ExpressVote and the work we have done for years
>>         with Prime
>>         III, prints a voter-verifiable paper ballot on a single sheet
>>         of paper
>>         versus the VVPAT on a continuous roll behind a glass screen.
>>         To my
>>         knowledge, no one has condemned this approach as insecure in
>>         any way.
>>         Has anyone heard anything different?
>>
>>
>>         Thanks,
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>         On 7/28/16 10:11 AM, Brent Turner wrote:
>>         > Currently the " secret software  " systems coupled with
>>         VVPAT's are
>>         > condemned as insecure by government study, so we don't have to
>>         > consider the internet to sound those alarms. Ed Felton from
>>         OSTP
>>         > confirms.
>>
>>         --
>>         Juan E. Gilbert, Ph.D.
>>         Andrew Banks Family Preeminence Endowed Professor & Chair
>>         Computer & Information Science & Engineering Department
>>         Herbert Wertheim College of Engineering
>>         University of Florida
>>         P.O. Box 116120
>>         Gainesville, FL 32611
>>         352.562.0784 <tel:352.562.0784> (V)
>>         352.273.0738 <tel:352.273.0738> (F)
>>         juan at ufl.edu <mailto:juan at ufl.edu>
>>         Twitter: @DrJuanGilbert
>>         http://www.juangilbert.com/
>>
>>         _______________________________________________
>>         CAVO mailing list
>>         CAVO at opensource.org <mailto:CAVO at opensource.org>
>>         https://lists.opensource.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/cavo
>>
>>
>
>     -- 
>     Juan E. Gilbert, Ph.D.
>     Andrew Banks Family Preeminence Endowed Professor & Chair
>     Computer & Information Science & Engineering Department
>     Herbert Wertheim College of Engineering
>     University of Florida
>     P.O. Box 116120
>     Gainesville, FL 32611
>     352.562.0784 <tel:352.562.0784>  (V)
>     352.273.0738 <tel:352.273.0738>  (F)
>     juan at ufl.edu <mailto:juan at ufl.edu>
>     Twitter: @DrJuanGilbert
>     http://www.juangilbert.com/  
>
>
>     _______________________________________________
>     CAVO mailing list
>     CAVO at opensource.org <mailto:CAVO at opensource.org>
>     https://lists.opensource.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/cavo
>
>

-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.opensource.org/pipermail/cavo_lists.opensource.org/attachments/20160728/d07b69e0/attachment.html>