<html>
<head>
<meta content="text/html; charset=utf-8" http-equiv="Content-Type">
</head>
<body bgcolor="#FFFFFF" text="#000000">
<font face="Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif">The VVPAT on a continuous
roll was NEVER what I and others had intended as an implementation
of Voter Verified Paper Ballots (VVPB). The continuous roll leaves
open the possibility of vote-selling and exposure of the ballot
contents because the order of the voters as they enter the polling
booth can be recorded and later synchronized to be revealed. There
have also been problems with the paper rolls jamming and ripping,
and there is also an electronic tally that can be used in lieu of
the paper. This is the same with the paper sheets. Typically the
paper is NEVER counted nor used for recounts.<br>
<br>
My concept of the VVPB uses the paper as the ACTUAL ballot.
Namely, the ballot that the voter sees and VERIFIES with an
affirmative action, is the TRUE ballot to be used for vote
tabulation and also for purposes of recounts. For example,
hand-prepared ballots that are publicly hand-tabulated, such as in
the UK, would qualify as VVPBs. Hand marked paper ballots that are
optically scanned are typically never hand-tabulated, and in some
regions (such as Florida) their hand-tabulation is PROHIBITED by
law. Some states, though, do provide for a hand recount of paper
ballots that the voters prepared or verified at the time of
voting, and that would be OK in my opinion.<br>
<br>
The positions of various academic proponents of different
balloting systems has tended to change over the years. Some also
allow for cryptographic voting, which they refer to as voter
"verifiable" which I also find unacceptable, since the voter
really cannot verify the mathematical implementations directly.<br>
<br>
For additional information about electronic voting, its inherent
problems, and my positions and writing, see the many papers and
articles on my website at <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="http://www.notablesoftware.com/evote.html">www.notablesoftware.com/evote.html</a><br>
<br>
Good luck trying to sort it all out,<br>
Rebecca Mercuri, Ph.D.<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
</font><br>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 7/28/2016 12:55 PM, Brent Turner
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote
cite="mid:CAB1+w6+w=sc-=dSS9oaoenrdbcBDR+bh8_=q3H0rbmND3HpS7w@mail.gmail.com"
type="cite">
<div dir="ltr">Right- O--
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Conversations with Felton have shown he is aligned with the
security community in recognizing VVPAT as a failed / botched
concept.. </div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Dr. Mercuri can chime in but my understanding is Dill stole
her design and failed to execute it properly.. </div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Perhaps it would be better with OS code.. Rebecca ? </div>
</div>
<div class="gmail_extra"><br>
<div class="gmail_quote">On Thu, Jul 28, 2016 at 9:42 AM,
Gilbert,Juan E <span dir="ltr"><<a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:juan@ufl.edu" target="_blank">juan@ufl.edu</a>></span>
wrote:<br>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0
.8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div bgcolor="#FFFFFF" text="#000000">
This isn't a VVPAT demo. He didn't discuss VVPATs in this
demonstration. The tally results were printed on a thermal
roll, but that's not a VVPAT.<br>
<br>
<br>
Thanks,<br>
<br>
<br>
<div>On 7/28/16 11:18 AM, Brent Turner wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite">
<div dir="ltr"><a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HBqGzgxcfAk"
target="_blank">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HBqGzgxcfAk</a><br>
</div>
<div class="gmail_extra"><br>
<div class="gmail_quote">On Thu, Jul 28, 2016 at 7:29
AM, Gilbert,Juan E <span dir="ltr">
<<a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:juan@ufl.edu" target="_blank">juan@ufl.edu</a>></span>
wrote:<br>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0
.8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
Brent, you said,<br>
<br>
Currently the " secret software " systems coupled
with VVPAT's are<br>
condemned as insecure by government study, so we
don't have to consider<br>
the internet to sound those alarms. Ed Felton from
OSTP confirms.<br>
<br>
<br>
Can you point me to those articles? I agree
VVPAT's have issues. Just to<br>
be clear, VVPATs are ballots printed on a
continuous thermal paper roll.<br>
However, ES&S ExpressVote and the work we have
done for years with Prime<br>
III, prints a voter-verifiable paper ballot on a
single sheet of paper<br>
versus the VVPAT on a continuous roll behind a
glass screen. To my<br>
knowledge, no one has condemned this approach as
insecure in any way.<br>
Has anyone heard anything different?<br>
<br>
<br>
Thanks,<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
On 7/28/16 10:11 AM, Brent Turner wrote:<br>
> Currently the " secret software " systems
coupled with VVPAT's are<br>
> condemned as insecure by government study, so
we don't have to<br>
> consider the internet to sound those alarms.
Ed Felton from OSTP<br>
> confirms.<br>
<br>
--<br>
Juan E. Gilbert, Ph.D.<br>
Andrew Banks Family Preeminence Endowed Professor
& Chair<br>
Computer & Information Science &
Engineering Department<br>
Herbert Wertheim College of Engineering<br>
University of Florida<br>
P.O. Box 116120<br>
Gainesville, FL 32611<br>
<a moz-do-not-send="true" href="tel:352.562.0784"
value="+13525620784" target="_blank">352.562.0784</a> (V)<br>
<a moz-do-not-send="true" href="tel:352.273.0738"
value="+13522730738" target="_blank">352.273.0738</a> (F)<br>
<a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:juan@ufl.edu" target="_blank">juan@ufl.edu</a><br>
Twitter: @DrJuanGilbert<br>
<a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="http://www.juangilbert.com/"
rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">http://www.juangilbert.com/</a><br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
CAVO mailing list<br>
<a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:CAVO@opensource.org"
target="_blank">CAVO@opensource.org</a><br>
<a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="https://lists.opensource.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/cavo"
rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://lists.opensource.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/cavo</a><br>
</blockquote>
</div>
<br>
</div>
</blockquote>
<br>
<pre cols="72">--
Juan E. Gilbert, Ph.D.
Andrew Banks Family Preeminence Endowed Professor & Chair
Computer & Information Science & Engineering Department
Herbert Wertheim College of Engineering
University of Florida
P.O. Box 116120
Gainesville, FL 32611
<a moz-do-not-send="true" href="tel:352.562.0784" value="+13525620784" target="_blank">352.562.0784</a> (V)
<a moz-do-not-send="true" href="tel:352.273.0738" value="+13522730738" target="_blank">352.273.0738</a> (F)
<a moz-do-not-send="true" href="mailto:juan@ufl.edu" target="_blank">juan@ufl.edu</a>
Twitter: @DrJuanGilbert
<a moz-do-not-send="true" href="http://www.juangilbert.com/" target="_blank">http://www.juangilbert.com/</a> </pre>
</div>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
CAVO mailing list<br>
<a moz-do-not-send="true" href="mailto:CAVO@opensource.org">CAVO@opensource.org</a><br>
<a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="https://lists.opensource.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/cavo"
rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://lists.opensource.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/cavo</a><br>
<br>
</blockquote>
</div>
<br>
</div>
</blockquote>
<br>
</body>
</html>