[CAVO] Future of Internet Voting

Brent Turner turnerbrentm at gmail.com
Mon Feb 8 22:25:19 UTC 2016

Although we are now heading to meeting..I always find it interesting when "
do-gooders " are afraid /hesitant  etc to meet with other do gooders ..
What are ya hidin ?

On Mon, Feb 8, 2016 at 1:57 PM, Lawrence Rosen <lrosen at rosenlaw.com> wrote:

> Your thoughts on this
> <https://www.usvotefoundation.org/news/E2E-VIV-press>? /Larry
> ****************************Consensus Reached on Recommendations Toward
> the Future of Internet Voting
> [image:
> https://www.usvotefoundation.org/sites/default/files/styles/medium/public/verification%20of%20tally.jpg?itok=7eMKVqv2]
>  *U.S. Vote Foundation Releases New System Requirements, Specifications,
> Architecture and *
> *Cryptographic Foundations for End-to-End Verifiable Internet Voting *
> *PORTLAND, ME* – July 10, 2015 – Today’s release of The Future of Voting:
> End-to-End Verifiable Internet Voting Specification and Feasibility
> Assessment Study <https://www.usvotefoundation.org/e2e-viv/summary> by
> U.S. Vote Foundation establishes a new reference for the security,
> usability and transparency requirements essential to the U.S. in any
> consideration of Internet voting for public elections. The announcement was
> made at the Annual Summer Conference of the National Association of
> Secretaries of State, hosted this year in Portland, Maine.
> Developed by a team of the nation’s leading experts in election integrity,
> election administration, high-assurance systems engineering, and
> cryptography, the report starts from the premise that public elections in
> the U.S. are a matter of national security. The authors assert that
> Internet voting systems must be transparent and designed to run in a manner
> that embraces the constructs of end-to-end verifiability – a property
> missing from existing Internet voting systems.
> An end-to-end verifiable (E2E-V) voting system allows voters to 1) check
> that the system recorded their votes correctly; 2) check that the system
> included their votes in the final tally; 3) count the recorded votes and
> double-check the announced outcome of the election.  An Internet voting
> system that is end-to-end verifiable is an E2E-VIV system. The new set of
> system specifications that could eventually lead to a model E2E-VIV system
> includes an ideal cryptographic foundation, security, audit, and usability
> considerations, as well as technical approaches to the system architecture.
> As election technology evolves and more states evaluate Internet voting,
> caution on compromises to integrity and security is warranted, and
> according to the report, should be particularly avoided by the premature
> deployment of Internet voting. The report aims to list the security
> challenges that exist with Internet voting and emphasizes that research
> should continue as the threat landscape continues to shift. Existing
> proprietary systems that meet only a subset of the requirements cannot be
> considered secure enough for use in the U.S.
> *Key recommendations in the report to make Internet voting more secure and
> transparent include*:
> 1.     *Any public elections conducted over the Internet must be
> end-to-end verifiable *– The report asserts that the use of Internet
> voting systems without end-to-end verifiability is irresponsible, and E2E-V
> is the only publicly available technology that provides assurance an
> Internet voting system is secure and transparent.
> 2.     *End-to-End Verifiable systems must be in-person and supervised
> first *– It is critical to first enhance the security of in-person voting
> systems with E2E-V, and learn from its deployment, before assuming the more
> complex task of deploying E2E-VIV systems.
> 3.     *End-to-End Verifiable Internet Voting systems must be high
> assurance* – E2E-VIV systems must be designed, constructed, verified,
> certified, operated and supported according to the most rigorous
> engineering requirements of mission- and safety-critical systems. A voting
> system vulnerable to privacy violations, programming errors, and security
> issues will undermine the trust of the electorate and validity of the
> results.
> 4.     *End-to-End Verifiable Internet Voting systems must be usable and
> accessible to all voters* – E2E-VIV systems must ensure usability and
> accessibility for all voters including those with disabilities.
> 5.     *Maintain aggressive election R&D efforts* – Formidable challenges
> in usability, reliability and security remain for the development of
> E2E-VIV systems and will require continued investment in peer-reviewed
> research and development to overcome.
> *See the Executive Summary*
> <https://www.usvotefoundation.org/e2e-viv/summary>
> *Download the Full Report or Sections*
> <https://www.usvotefoundation.org/E2E-VIV>
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