Contract or License?
Karsten M. Self
kmself at ix.netcom.com
Sat Sep 15 00:41:36 UTC 2001
on Fri, Sep 14, 2001 at 08:31:05PM -0400, Rod Dixon, J.D., LL.M. (rod at cyberspaces.org) wrote:
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Karsten M. Self [mailto:kmself at ix.netcom.com]
> > Sent: Friday, September 14, 2001 7:39 PM
> > To: license-discuss at opensource.org
> > Subject: Re: Contract or License?
> > on Fri, Sep 14, 2001 at 06:20:19PM -0400, Rod Dixon
> > (rodd at cyberspaces.org) wrote:
> > > On Fri, 14 Sep 2001, Karsten M. Self wrote:
> > >
> > > > on Fri, Sep 14, 2001 at 09:31:10AM -0700, Lawrence E. Rosen
> > (lrosen at rosenlaw.com) wrote:
> > > > > Karsten,
> > > > >
> > > > > > > Copyright law does not restrict use of an authorized copy.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > It does now.
> > Any attempt to use copyright law to constrain use of a copy of a work --
> > use in such a form that does not produce a fixed copy in tangible
> > medium, and text-to-speach is such non-fixed expression of a work -- is
> > creating a fundamentally new interpretation of copyright law. Section
> > 1201 has already done this, but barring 1201, I cannot see
> > text-to-speech as an exclusive right.
> > Copyright specifically addresses various works covered by copyright
> > (sections 102 and 103):
> > http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/102.html
> > (a) Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in
> > original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of
> > expression, now known or later developed, from which they can be
> > perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or
> > with the aid of a machine or device. Works of authorship include the
> > following categories:
> > (1) literary works;
> > (2) musical works, including any accompanying words;
> > (3) dramtic works, including any accompanying music;
> > (4) pantomimes and chreographic works;
> > (5) pictoral, graphic, and sculptural works;
> > (6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works;
> > (7) sound recordings; and
> > (8) architectural works.
> > (b) In no case does copyright protection for an original work of
> > authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of
> > operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in
> > which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in a work.
> > As I read that, securing copyright protections to prohibit a mode of
> > extraction of expression is expressly excluded by 102(b), as a "process,
> > system, [or] method of operation".
> > IANAL, TINLA
Rod, please consider postfix responses. It makes tracking arguments and
discussion far more clear.
> Hmm... You were on much better footing before when you appeared to
> stay close to traditional copyright. Your statements [above] about
> 1201 of the DMCA are not accurate. I doubt that the word "content
> control" appears anywhere in 1201; that section focuses on access
> controls and the circumvention of access controls, which have nothing
> to do with section 106 rights.
Chapter 12 is titled "Copyright Protection and Management Systems",
title 1201 is titled "Circumvention of copyright protection", and
1201(a) expressly concerns "a technological measure that effectively
controlls access to a work". The strict language I used doesn't occur
(though both the words "content" and "control" do).
I submit that given current enforcement actions, and the judicial
interpretations to date in the 2600 and Santa Clara RIAA cases, my
portrayal of current circumstances is accurate.
> If your point is that blocking access to a work effectively means all
> uses of the work are subsumed under copyright, I cannot agree with
> that point.
I didn't say that, and I don't mean that.
I said, and I quote:
There are specific usage restrictions imposed by the DMCA that
aren't strictly limited to RAM images.
And I mean just that. Within certain, specific, narrow, scope, the DMCA
proscribes use of copyrighted material (as well as actions regardless of
whether they pertain to copyrighted works).
> As you will recall, copyright law must be anchored by its
> constitutional basis set forth at Art. I sec. 8, cl. 8.
If this fact is so immediately evident to the assembled parties, why was
it not perceived by any of the legislators of this fine country, at
least some of whom are hopefully versed in Constitutional law and powers
> I suspect what the DMCA has to do with that the Supreme Court will
> inevitably have to tell us. Consequently, your conclusion based upon
> section 1201 of the DMCA is premature.
No. They're a realistic assesment of current conditions.
> We will have to see how much of the DMCA survives challenge.
Yes, we are agreed here.
Karsten M. Self <kmself at ix.netcom.com> http://kmself.home.netcom.com/
Praying for the victims.
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