<div dir="ltr">This comment is accurate 100%. The election officials are the heroes here. Roy Saltman is the name I was searching for. Does anyone know how to get in touch with Roy? He is knowledgeable. We need to work very hard to differentiate vulnerability to hacks from election official diligence. What we are looking at here is fraud without detection and this is outside the purview of the the dedicated, competent election officials. <div>Ssan</div></div><div class="gmail_extra"><br><div class="gmail_quote">On Fri, Jul 29, 2016 at 11:27 AM, Brent Turner <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:turnerbrentm@gmail.com" target="_blank">turnerbrentm@gmail.com</a>></span> wrote:<br><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir="ltr">Dale-- No one is alleging complicity on behalf of the election officials.. more an act of negligence in not pushing for publicly owned / more secure voting systems. The distrust of the current systems starts with the " secret " corporate owned software issue.. and the general vendor control of the event. This is exacerbated by the vendor lock-in and the overly cozy relationship between the vendors and some clerks cemented by business leagues ( parties and junkets etc ) i.e CACEO in California.. <div><br></div><div>Once publicly owned / open source ( GPL ) systems are in place the public confidence will soar. The public still craves paper ballots as well which the CAVO advocated precinct system prints perfectly. </div><div><br></div><div>The certification system .. per Roy Saltman and a host of others .. needs a complete overhaul from the Fed to the States .. and that is the plan for open source certifications. Ryan Macias stated he did not believe there to be much difference in that process .. but we are available for assisting that effort-</div><div><br></div><div>Brent</div><div><br></div><div>California Association of Voting Officials </div></div><div class="HOEnZb"><div class="h5"><div class="gmail_extra"><br><div class="gmail_quote">On Fri, Jul 29, 2016 at 4:20 AM, livingston, dale <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:delivingston@harfordcountymd.gov" target="_blank">delivingston@harfordcountymd.gov</a>></span> wrote:<br><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
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<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:black">We had a similar system in Maryland, prior to going back to a paper system this past Primary Election. We also had and have numerous checks and balances and care and custody in place to assure that when the polls
opened in the morning our equipment was secure and working properly. And as in Colorado, our system has to be State certified.<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:black"><u></u> <u></u></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:black">I also believe that one of the main reasons there is so much distrust by the general public is because they are not aware or educated about elections or the voting systems put in place for them. We are trying
to educate generations of people who don’t even know who their County Executive or in some cases even the Vice President of the United States. Seriously, not even our politicians are interested in what we do, but rather spend 90% of their time campaigning
for their next election. If someone wants to HACK into a system, any system, they are going to try. It is how we address such a situation, both prior to purchasing a system and if someone does make an attempt to HACK it, that the public is going to look
at. Their perception must be that we as election officials are doing everything in our power to give them fair, safe, and accurate elections. And in my shop, we do just that.<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:black"><u></u> <u></u></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:black">Dale Livingston<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:black"><u></u> <u></u></span></p>
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<p class="MsoNormal"><i><span style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Brush Script";color:#1f497d">Dale E. Livingston<u></u><u></u></span></i></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><i><span style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Brush Script";color:#1f497d">Deputy Director<u></u><u></u></span></i></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><i><span style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Brush Script";color:#1f497d">Harford County Board of Elections<u></u><u></u></span></i></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><i><span style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Brush Script";color:#1f497d"><a href="tel:410-809-6002" value="+14108096002" target="_blank">410-809-6002</a> (Direct Line)<u></u><u></u></span></i></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><i><span style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Brush Script";color:#1f497d"><a href="tel:443-417-0156" value="+14434170156" target="_blank">443-417-0156</a> (Cell)<u></u><u></u></span></i></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><i><span style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Brush Script";color:#1f497d"><a href="tel:410-638-3565" value="+14106383565" target="_blank">410-638-3565</a> (General Office)<u></u><u></u></span></i></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><i><span style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Brush Script";color:#1f497d"><a href="tel:410-638-4413" value="+14106384413" target="_blank">410-638-4413</a> (fax)<u></u><u></u></span></i></p>
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<p class="MsoNormal"><b><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"">From:</span></b><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif""> <a href="mailto:vvsg-pre-election-bounces@nist.gov" target="_blank">vvsg-pre-election-bounces@nist.gov</a> [mailto:<a href="mailto:vvsg-pre-election-bounces@nist.gov" target="_blank">vvsg-pre-election-bounces@nist.gov</a>]
<b>On Behalf Of </b>Wayne Williams<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Thursday, July 28, 2016 11:57 PM<br>
<b>To:</b> Susan Eustis; Joseph Kiniry<br>
<b>Cc:</b> vvsg-pre-election; Arthur Keller; vvsg-election; Deutsch, Herb; Stephen Berger; vvsg-post-election; vvsg-interoperability<br>
<b>Subject:</b> Re: [VVSG-pre-election] [VVSG-interoperability] Separating Issues and Avoiding Ghost Stories - RE: By November, Russian hackers could target voting machines<u></u><u></u></span></p>
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<p><span style="font-size:11.0pt;color:#212121;background:white">The voting machines used in Colorado are not connected to the Internet. Colorado has vigorous voting-systems standards that require all voting systems to operate on a closed network that cannot
be accessed through the Internet. </span><span style="font-size:11.0pt;color:#212121"><br>
<span style="background:white"> </span><br>
<span style="background:white">In addition, counties must use a voting system that has been certified by the Colorado Secretary of State as meeting all security requirements.</span></span><span style="font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black"><u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p><span style="font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black"><u></u> <u></u></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:11.0pt;color:black">Wayne Williams</span><span style="font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black"><u></u><u></u></span></p>
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<p class="MsoNormal"><b><span style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black">From:</span></b><span style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:black">
<a href="mailto:vvsg-pre-election-bounces@nist.gov" target="_blank">vvsg-pre-election-bounces@nist.gov</a> <<a href="mailto:vvsg-pre-election-bounces@nist.gov" target="_blank">vvsg-pre-election-bounces@nist.gov</a>> on behalf of Susan Eustis <<a href="mailto:susan@wintergreenresearch.com" target="_blank">susan@wintergreenresearch.com</a>><br>
<b>Sent:</b> Thursday, July 28, 2016 5:41 PM<br>
<b>To:</b> Joseph Kiniry<br>
<b>Cc:</b> vvsg-pre-election; Arthur Keller; vvsg-election; Deutsch, Herb; Stephen Berger; vvsg-post-election; vvsg-interoperability<br>
<b>Subject:</b> Re: [VVSG-pre-election] [VVSG-interoperability] Separating Issues and Avoiding Ghost Stories - RE: By November, Russian hackers could target voting machines</span><span style="font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#212121">
<u></u><u></u></span></p>
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<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#212121">Joe, I do get to write about this, so I know it exists, but in the real world election of Novenber not have that, and we have a not so veiled threat to hack the systems so I
believe that is the issue we need to address. How do we leverage the audit trail the systems tout and do it in a manner that is timely and relevant to what can be a disastrous unraveling of our political core. Do you have any suggestions about the audit
trail use ?<u></u><u></u></span></p>
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<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#212121">On Thu, Jul 28, 2016 at 6:21 PM, Joseph Kiniry <<a href="mailto:kiniry@galois.com" target="_blank">kiniry@galois.com</a>> wrote:<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#212121">Susan et al.,<br>
<br>
> On Jul 28, 2016, at 07:12, Susan Eustis <<a href="mailto:susan@wintergreenresearch.com" target="_blank">susan@wintergreenresearch.com</a>> wrote:<br>
><br>
> I believe the problems are 2:<br>
> 1. How to make fraud detectable, the code base in any electronics is vulnerable where-ever it is, Code can be changed without detection and this needs to be addressed.<br>
<br>
I keep hearing this statement made in many forums and continue to bring up the fact that there is some excellent R&D going on wrt this topic which has been seeing practical application in the DOD space for a few years.<br>
<br>
It is now the case that you can prove that the application (and operating system &c) you have is exactly what you think it is an moreover that a running system is executing exactly that software.<br>
<br>
This is hard. Few people know how to do it. No existing/traditional elections vendor does it or knows how to do it. But it is a solved problem now.<br>
<br>
I’m happy to go into deep technical detail with anyone who is interested and point to the relevant peer-reviewed work, but this is not the forum for such.<br>
<br>
Joe<u></u><u></u></span></p>
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<br>
Susan Eustis<br>
President<br>
WinterGreen Research<br>
6 Raymond Street<br>
Lexington, Massachusetts<br>
phone <a href="tel:781%20863%205078" value="+17818635078" target="_blank">781 863 5078</a><br>
cell <a href="tel:617%20852%207876" value="+16178527876" target="_blank">617 852 7876</a> <u></u><u></u></span></p>
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</div></div></blockquote></div><br><br clear="all"><div><br></div>-- <br><div class="gmail_signature" data-smartmail="gmail_signature"><div dir="ltr">-- <br><br>Susan Eustis<br>President<br>WinterGreen Research<br>6 Raymond Street<br>Lexington, Massachusetts<br>phone 781 863 5078<br>cell 617 852 7876
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