<html>
<head>
<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=us-ascii">
</head>
<body bgcolor="#FFFFFF" text="#000000">
Hi Rebecca, it's been a while since I've seen you.<br>
<br>
Yes, VVPATs are bad for all the reasons you have mentioned. I also agree that the cryptographic voting schemes are vulnerable to manipulation and human error as well. The work we have done provides a human countable ballot. It could be machine countable as
well. I know the election officials prefer to use a machine to count the ballots due to the time it takes to manually count the ballots. In our work, either way is fine.
<br>
<br>
<br>
I hope you are doing well.<br>
<br>
<br>
Thanks,<br>
<br>
<br>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 7/28/16 3:16 PM, DrM wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote cite="mid:579A595C.40102@mindspring.com" type="cite"><font face="Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif">The VVPAT on a continuous roll was NEVER what I and others had intended as an implementation of Voter Verified Paper Ballots (VVPB). The continuous roll
leaves open the possibility of vote-selling and exposure of the ballot contents because the order of the voters as they enter the polling booth can be recorded and later synchronized to be revealed. There have also been problems with the paper rolls jamming
and ripping, and there is also an electronic tally that can be used in lieu of the paper. This is the same with the paper sheets. Typically the paper is NEVER counted nor used for recounts.<br>
<br>
My concept of the VVPB uses the paper as the ACTUAL ballot. Namely, the ballot that the voter sees and VERIFIES with an affirmative action, is the TRUE ballot to be used for vote tabulation and also for purposes of recounts. For example, hand-prepared ballots
that are publicly hand-tabulated, such as in the UK, would qualify as VVPBs. Hand marked paper ballots that are optically scanned are typically never hand-tabulated, and in some regions (such as Florida) their hand-tabulation is PROHIBITED by law. Some states,
though, do provide for a hand recount of paper ballots that the voters prepared or verified at the time of voting, and that would be OK in my opinion.<br>
<br>
The positions of various academic proponents of different balloting systems has tended to change over the years. Some also allow for cryptographic voting, which they refer to as voter "verifiable" which I also find unacceptable, since the voter really cannot
verify the mathematical implementations directly.<br>
<br>
For additional information about electronic voting, its inherent problems, and my positions and writing, see the many papers and articles on my website at
<a moz-do-not-send="true" class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="http://www.notablesoftware.com/evote.html">
www.notablesoftware.com/evote.html</a><br>
<br>
Good luck trying to sort it all out,<br>
Rebecca Mercuri, Ph.D.<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
</font><br>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 7/28/2016 12:55 PM, Brent Turner wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote cite="mid:CAB1+w6+w=sc-=dSS9oaoenrdbcBDR+bh8_=q3H0rbmND3HpS7w@mail.gmail.com" type="cite">
<div dir="ltr">Right- O--
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Conversations with Felton have shown he is aligned with the security community in recognizing VVPAT as a failed / botched concept.. </div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Dr. Mercuri can chime in but my understanding is Dill stole her design and failed to execute it properly.. </div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Perhaps it would be better with OS code.. Rebecca ? </div>
</div>
<div class="gmail_extra"><br>
<div class="gmail_quote">On Thu, Jul 28, 2016 at 9:42 AM, Gilbert,Juan E <span dir="ltr">
<<a moz-do-not-send="true" href="mailto:juan@ufl.edu" target="_blank">juan@ufl.edu</a>></span> wrote:<br>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0
.8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div bgcolor="#FFFFFF" text="#000000">This isn't a VVPAT demo. He didn't discuss VVPATs in this demonstration. The tally results were printed on a thermal roll, but that's not a VVPAT.<br>
<br>
<br>
Thanks,<br>
<br>
<br>
<div>On 7/28/16 11:18 AM, Brent Turner wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite">
<div dir="ltr"><a moz-do-not-send="true" href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HBqGzgxcfAk" target="_blank">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HBqGzgxcfAk</a><br>
</div>
<div class="gmail_extra"><br>
<div class="gmail_quote">On Thu, Jul 28, 2016 at 7:29 AM, Gilbert,Juan E <span dir="ltr">
<<a moz-do-not-send="true" href="mailto:juan@ufl.edu" target="_blank">juan@ufl.edu</a>></span> wrote:<br>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0
0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc
solid;padding-left:1ex">
Brent, you said,<br>
<br>
Currently the " secret software " systems coupled with VVPAT's are<br>
condemned as insecure by government study, so we don't have to consider<br>
the internet to sound those alarms. Ed Felton from OSTP confirms.<br>
<br>
<br>
Can you point me to those articles? I agree VVPAT's have issues. Just to<br>
be clear, VVPATs are ballots printed on a continuous thermal paper roll.<br>
However, ES&S ExpressVote and the work we have done for years with Prime<br>
III, prints a voter-verifiable paper ballot on a single sheet of paper<br>
versus the VVPAT on a continuous roll behind a glass screen. To my<br>
knowledge, no one has condemned this approach as insecure in any way.<br>
Has anyone heard anything different?<br>
<br>
<br>
Thanks,<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
On 7/28/16 10:11 AM, Brent Turner wrote:<br>
> Currently the " secret software " systems coupled with VVPAT's are<br>
> condemned as insecure by government study, so we don't have to<br>
> consider the internet to sound those alarms. Ed Felton from OSTP<br>
> confirms.<br>
<br>
--<br>
Juan E. Gilbert, Ph.D.<br>
Andrew Banks Family Preeminence Endowed Professor & Chair<br>
Computer & Information Science & Engineering Department<br>
Herbert Wertheim College of Engineering<br>
University of Florida<br>
P.O. Box 116120<br>
Gainesville, FL 32611<br>
<a moz-do-not-send="true" href="tel:352.562.0784" value="+13525620784" target="_blank">352.562.0784</a> (V)<br>
<a moz-do-not-send="true" href="tel:352.273.0738" value="+13522730738" target="_blank">352.273.0738</a> (F)<br>
<a moz-do-not-send="true" href="mailto:juan@ufl.edu" target="_blank">juan@ufl.edu</a><br>
Twitter: @DrJuanGilbert<br>
<a moz-do-not-send="true" href="http://www.juangilbert.com/" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">http://www.juangilbert.com/</a><br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
CAVO mailing list<br>
<a moz-do-not-send="true" href="mailto:CAVO@opensource.org" target="_blank">CAVO@opensource.org</a><br>
<a moz-do-not-send="true" href="https://lists.opensource.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/cavo" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://lists.opensource.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/cavo</a><br>
</blockquote>
</div>
<br>
</div>
</blockquote>
<br>
<pre cols="72">--
Juan E. Gilbert, Ph.D.
Andrew Banks Family Preeminence Endowed Professor & Chair
Computer & Information Science & Engineering Department
Herbert Wertheim College of Engineering
University of Florida
P.O. Box 116120
Gainesville, FL 32611
<a moz-do-not-send="true" href="tel:352.562.0784" value="+13525620784" target="_blank">352.562.0784</a> (V)
<a moz-do-not-send="true" href="tel:352.273.0738" value="+13522730738" target="_blank">352.273.0738</a> (F)
<a moz-do-not-send="true" href="mailto:juan@ufl.edu" target="_blank">juan@ufl.edu</a>
Twitter: @DrJuanGilbert
<a moz-do-not-send="true" href="http://www.juangilbert.com/" target="_blank">http://www.juangilbert.com/</a> </pre>
</div>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
CAVO mailing list<br>
<a moz-do-not-send="true" href="mailto:CAVO@opensource.org">CAVO@opensource.org</a><br>
<a moz-do-not-send="true" href="https://lists.opensource.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/cavo" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://lists.opensource.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/cavo</a><br>
<br>
</blockquote>
</div>
<br>
</div>
</blockquote>
<br>
</blockquote>
<br>
<pre class="moz-signature" cols="72">--
Juan E. Gilbert, Ph.D.
Andrew Banks Family Preeminence Endowed Professor & Chair
Computer & Information Science & Engineering Department
Herbert Wertheim College of Engineering
University of Florida
P.O. Box 116120
Gainesville, FL 32611
352.562.0784 (V)
352.273.0738 (F)
<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:juan@ufl.edu">juan@ufl.edu</a>
Twitter: @DrJuanGilbert
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://www.juangilbert.com/">http://www.juangilbert.com/</a> </pre>
</body>
</html>