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</o:shapelayout></xml><![endif]--></head><body lang=EN-US link=blue vlink=purple><div class=WordSection1><p class=MsoNormal><b><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif'>From:</span></b><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif'> Brent Turner [mailto:turnerbrentm@gmail.com] <br><b>Sent:</b> Thursday, July 28, 2016 8:16 AM<br><b>To:</b> Alan Dechert <dechert@gmail.com>; Alec Bash <alec.bash@gmail.com>; Tim Mayer <timbmayer@gmail.com>; Chris Jerdonek <chris.jerdonek@gmail.com>; Brian Fox <bfox@opuslogica.com>; Lawrence Rosen <lrosen@rosenlaw.com>; Brigette Hunley <brigette.hunley@gmail.com><br><b>Subject:</b> Fwd: [VVSG-election] [VVSG-interoperability] Single Point of Failure - the Scan Head - RE: By November, Russian hackers could target voting machines<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p><div><p class=MsoNormal>fyi<o:p></o:p></p><div><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-bottom:12.0pt'>---------- Forwarded message ----------<br>From: <b>Brent Turner</b> <<a href="mailto:turnerbrentm@gmail.com">turnerbrentm@gmail.com</a>><br>Date: Thu, Jul 28, 2016 at 8:11 AM<br>Subject: Re: [VVSG-election] [VVSG-interoperability] Single Point of Failure - the Scan Head - RE: By November, Russian hackers could target voting machines<br>To: "Wack, John (Fed)" <<a href="mailto:john.wack@nist.gov">john.wack@nist.gov</a>><br>Cc: Arthur Keller <<a href="mailto:ark@soe.ucsc.edu">ark@soe.ucsc.edu</a>>, Stephen Berger <<a href="mailto:stephen.berger@suddenlink.net">stephen.berger@suddenlink.net</a>>, vvsg-election <<a href="mailto:vvsg-election@nist.gov">vvsg-election@nist.gov</a>>, vvsg-pre-election <<a href="mailto:vvsg-pre-election@nist.gov">vvsg-pre-election@nist.gov</a>>, vvsg-post-election <<a href="mailto:vvsg-post-election@nist.gov">vvsg-post-election@nist.gov</a>>, vvsg-interoperability <<a href="mailto:vvsg-interoperability@nist.gov">vvsg-interoperability@nist.gov</a>>, CAVO <<a href="mailto:CAVO@opensource.org">CAVO@opensource.org</a>><br><br><o:p></o:p></p><div><p class=MsoNormal>Thanks for the nod, John.. <o:p></o:p></p><div><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal>We have the first count systems in motion for build out in SF. The plan is to utilize GPL v3 open source with COTS hardware.. <o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal>The real obstacle has been the Microsoft / Intellectual Property lobbyist stranglehold on the politicians that apparently runs through the business leagues of the election administrators. Currently the vendors are pushing for " one more bite of the apple " before the jurisdictions follow New Hampshire and CA toward open source systems. <o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal>Perhaps a memo should go out to the jurisdictions mentioning the looming open source voting system availability .. and advising them to " stand in place " regarding further purchases of proprietary systems. <o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal>Best-<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal>Brent <o:p></o:p></p></div></div><div><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p><div><p class=MsoNormal>On Thu, Jul 28, 2016 at 7:38 AM, Wack, John (Fed) <<a href="mailto:john.wack@nist.gov" target="_blank">john.wack@nist.gov</a>> wrote:<o:p></o:p></p><blockquote style='border:none;border-left:solid #CCCCCC 1.0pt;padding:0in 0in 0in 6.0pt;margin-left:4.8pt;margin-right:0in'><div><div><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif'>I hesitate to jump in, but I do agree that it’s very very important to get the election night count accurate. I tend to think that no matter what, it’s a human process, a logistical nightmare for some locales, and that this needs to be recognized in technical discussions and recommendations. One of the best things to do, in my opinion, to make things more secure and more accurate, falls into the usability category for tabulation: perhaps election results shall not be released until such and such a time on the next day, say noon. Pressure to get everything correct in a very short amount of time after a long day works against security and accuracy. No matter what technology we use or how secure or whatever, it can’t erase the fact that the overall process is a very demanding management issue. </span><o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif'> </span><o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif'>The CDF work can help to make that easier, common identifiers for geopolitical geography and contests can help to make it easier, and there are probably a host of other items that could help to reduce the amount of time (and software required) to get all the equipment to work together smoothly. So as I’m reading the posts, I’m thinking about future VVSG requirements to make all the equipment work together so that the overall tabulation process is more usable to the election people conducting it. Of course, giving them more time to do would help significantly.</span><o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif'> </span><o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif'>Cheers, John </span><o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif'> </span><o:p></o:p></p><div><div style='border:none;border-top:solid #E1E1E1 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in'><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'><b><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif'>From:</span></b><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif'> <a href="mailto:vvsg-interoperability-bounces@nist.gov" target="_blank">vvsg-interoperability-bounces@nist.gov</a> [mailto:<a href="mailto:vvsg-interoperability-bounces@nist.gov" target="_blank">vvsg-interoperability-bounces@nist.gov</a>] <b>On Behalf Of </b>Arthur Keller<br><b>Sent:</b> Thursday, July 28, 2016 10:20 AM<br><b>To:</b> Stephen Berger <<a href="mailto:stephen.berger@suddenlink.net" target="_blank">stephen.berger@suddenlink.net</a>><br><b>Cc:</b> vvsg-election <<a href="mailto:vvsg-election@nist.gov" target="_blank">vvsg-election@nist.gov</a>>; vvsg-pre-election <<a href="mailto:vvsg-pre-election@nist.gov" target="_blank">vvsg-pre-election@nist.gov</a>>; vvsg-post-election <<a href="mailto:vvsg-post-election@nist.gov" target="_blank">vvsg-post-election@nist.gov</a>>; vvsg-interoperability <<a href="mailto:vvsg-interoperability@nist.gov" target="_blank">vvsg-interoperability@nist.gov</a>><br><b>Subject:</b> Re: [VVSG-interoperability] Single Point of Failure - the Scan Head - RE: By November, Russian hackers could target voting machines</span><o:p></o:p></p></div></div><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'> <o:p></o:p></p><div><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'>Thanks, Stephen. I think you mean scanner software is NEVER examined. <o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'> <o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'>Best regards,<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'>Arthur<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;margin-bottom:12.0pt'><br>On Jul 28, 2016, at 7:02 AM, Stephen Berger <<a href="mailto:stephen.berger@suddenlink.net" target="_blank">stephen.berger@suddenlink.net</a>> wrote:<o:p></o:p></p></div><blockquote style='margin-top:5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt'><div><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif'>Susan,</span><o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif'> </span><o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif'>Good points. </span><o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif'> </span><o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif'>Let add to the landscape that currently we have a single point of failure that I think deserves some attention. That point is when the ballot is scanned. Typically the scan mechanism is not specified and the initial processing software is not specified. Almost all, actually to my knowledge all of the scanners first throw away a lot of information. Modern scanner electronics is able to get excellent resolution and color differentiation. There is a lot that can be done with high quality can images. However, the scanner software immediately throws away most of that information and make everything black or white. This is done because it makes mark recognition easier and it saves on machine memory. However, what is a vote is determined not off the image of the ballot but the processed image. To make matters worse, neither the VVSG or any election official, decides when a pixel should be determined to be black or white or how many pixels make a valid mark. This is left to each company and even each design team at each company. Even worse, it is often decided by the scanner engine manufacturer and that software is very examined in any of our processes.</span><o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif'> </span><o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif'>It would seem worth paying some attention to what happens between the ballot being feed to the scanner and a decision being made about what votes are on that paper. It also seems reasonable that election officials should be the ones deciding how big a mark is a valid mark and how various kinds of uncertain marks should be dealt with.</span><o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif'> </span><o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;margin-bottom:12.0pt'><span style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;color:navy'>Best Regards,<br><br><br></span><o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'><span style='font-size:10.0pt;color:navy'>Stephen Berger</span><o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'><b><span style='font-size:10.0pt;color:red'>TEM Consulting, LP</span></b><o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'><span lang=DE style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;color:navy'>Web Site - </span><b><i><span lang=DE style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;color:blue'><a href="http://www.temconsulting.com" target="_blank"><span style='font-style:normal'>www.temconsulting.com</span></a></span></i></b><span lang=DE style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;color:navy'> <br>E-MAIL - </span><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;color:navy'><a href="mailto:stephen.berger@ieee.org" target="_blank" title="blocked::mailto:stephen.berger@ieee.org
mailto:stephen.berger@ieee.org"><span lang=DE style='font-size:10.0pt'>stephen.berger@ieee.org</span></a></span><span lang=FR style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;color:navy'><br>Phone - <a href="tel:%28512%29%20864-3365" target="_blank">(512) 864-3365</a><br>Mobile - <a href="tel:%28512%29%20466-0833" target="_blank">(512) 466-0833</a><br>FAX - <a href="tel:%28512%29%20869-8709" target="_blank">(512) 869-8709</a></span><o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'><span lang=FR style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif'> </span><o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'><b><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif'>From:</span></b><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif'> <a href="mailto:vvsg-interoperability-bounces@nist.gov" target="_blank">vvsg-interoperability-bounces@nist.gov</a> [<a href="mailto:vvsg-interoperability-bounces@nist.gov" target="_blank">mailto:vvsg-interoperability-bounces@nist.gov</a>] <b>On Behalf Of </b>Susan Eustis<br><b>Sent:</b> Thursday, July 28, 2016 8:31 AM<br><b>To:</b> Arthur Keller <<a href="mailto:ark@soe.ucsc.edu" target="_blank">ark@soe.ucsc.edu</a>><br><b>Cc:</b> vvsg-election <<a href="mailto:vvsg-election@nist.gov" target="_blank">vvsg-election@nist.gov</a>>; vvsg-pre-election <<a href="mailto:vvsg-pre-election@nist.gov" target="_blank">vvsg-pre-election@nist.gov</a>>; vvsg-post-election <<a href="mailto:vvsg-post-election@nist.gov" target="_blank">vvsg-post-election@nist.gov</a>>; vvsg-interoperability <<a href="mailto:vvsg-interoperability@nist.gov" target="_blank">vvsg-interoperability@nist.gov</a>><br><b>Subject:</b> Re: [VVSG-interoperability] By November, Russian hackers could target voting machines</span><o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'> <o:p></o:p></p><div><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'>Arthur, I agree, I concur. My new book lays this scenario out in detail and provides suggestions for preventing the hacks, ways to protect the integrity of the election results, there needs to be safe guards and automatic recounts the very next day with observers representing all candidates, no matter whether the election was close or not. There needs to be an audit trail and a way to protect the integrity of the balloting that occurs before election day. There needs to be a way for the observers to make a duplicate of the original ballots as the recount goes on and to run those through their own counting scanner to determine the validity of the election. There needs to be a way to interrupt the recount at any time if someone has to go to the bathroom or falls asleep so that the recount process has continuity and integrity. Things like this.<o:p></o:p></p><div><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'>Susan<o:p></o:p></p></div></div><div><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'> <o:p></o:p></p><div><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'>On Thu, Jul 28, 2016 at 9:22 AM, Arthur Keller <<a href="mailto:ark@soe.ucsc.edu" target="_blank">ark@soe.ucsc.edu</a>> wrote:<o:p></o:p></p><blockquote style='border:none;border-left:solid #CCCCCC 1.0pt;padding:0in 0in 0in 6.0pt;margin-left:4.8pt;margin-top:5.0pt;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:5.0pt'><div><div><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'>But vote tabulation and especially roll up is often connected to the Internet. And with the lack of effective audits in more jurisdictions, hacking the Internet-connected vote tabulation systems would do the trick. <o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'> <o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'>In particular, if the vote tabulation system is connected to the web reporting system, then that's an avenue for attack. <o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'> <o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'>There's a difference between auditable and actually audited. If the results are sufficiently skewed on election night, post election audits may not matter anyway. They didn't even matter in Florida in 2000 where the election was close. <o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'> <o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'>Could the programming of electronic voting machines be hacked in a Stuxnet type attack while they are loaded with the election data file?<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'> <o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'>If China can hack Google, do we really believe there's no way Russia can't hack enough counties or states to change the outcome of the presidential election?<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'> <o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'>Best regards,<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'>Arthur<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><div><div><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;margin-bottom:12.0pt'><br>On Jul 28, 2016, at 6:07 AM, Deutsch, Herb <<a href="mailto:hdeutsch@essvote.com" target="_blank">hdeutsch@essvote.com</a>> wrote:<o:p></o:p></p></div><blockquote style='margin-top:5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt'><div><div><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;color:#1F497D'>Voting machines are not attached to the internet. You can’t hack them without physical control and that is auditable.</span><o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;color:#1F497D'> </span><o:p></o:p></p><div><div style='border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in'><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'><b><span style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma",sans-serif'>From:</span></b><span style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma",sans-serif'> <a href="mailto:vvsg-interoperability-bounces@nist.gov" target="_blank">vvsg-interoperability-bounces@nist.gov</a> [<a href="mailto:vvsg-interoperability-bounces@nist.gov" target="_blank">mailto:vvsg-interoperability-bounces@nist.gov</a>] <b>On Behalf Of </b>Arthur Keller<br><b>Sent:</b> Thursday, July 28, 2016 12:30 AM<br><b>To:</b> John Wack<br><b>Cc:</b> vvsg-election; vvsg-pre-election; vvsg-post-election; vvsg-interoperability<br><b>Subject:</b> [VVSG-interoperability] By November, Russian hackers could target voting machines</span><o:p></o:p></p></div></div><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'> <o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'>What should the election community do about this threat?<o:p></o:p></p><div><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'> <o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'>Best regards,<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'>Arthur<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'> <o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'><a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2016/07/27/by-november-russian-hackers-could-target-voting-machines/" target="_blank">https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2016/07/27/by-november-russian-hackers-could-target-voting-machines/</a><o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'> <o:p></o:p></p></div><div><div><div><div><div><div><h1>By November, Russian hackers could target voting machines<o:p></o:p></h1></div></div></div></div></div><div><div><h2>If Russia really is responsible, there's no reason political interference would end with the DNC emails.<o:p></o:p></h2></div></div><div><div><div><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'><span style='border:solid windowtext 1.0pt;padding:0in'><img border=0 width=100 height=100 style='width:1.0416in;height:1.0416in' id="_x0000_i1025" src="cid:image001.jpg@01D1E8BC.17DBC6F0" alt="Image removed by sender."></span><o:p></o:p></p><div><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'>By Bruce Schneier July 27 at 3:10 PM <o:p></o:p></p><div><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'><a href="https://www.schneier.com" target="_blank">Bruce Schneier</a> is a security technologist and a lecturer at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. His latest book is <a href="https://www.schneier.com/book-dg.html" target="_blank"><i>Data and Goliath: The Hidden Battles to Collect Your Data and Control Your World</i></a>.<o:p></o:p></p></div></div></div><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'>Russia was behind the hacks into the Democratic National Committee’s computer network that led to the release of thousands of internal emails just before the party’s convention began, U.S. intelligence agencies have <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/27/world/europe/russia-dnc-hack-emails.html" target="_blank">reportedly</a> concluded.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'>The FBI is investigating. WikiLeaks <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2016/07/26/politics/julian-assange-dnc-email-leak-hack/" target="_blank">promises</a> there is more data to come. The <a href="http://www.defenseone.com/technology/2016/07/how-putin-weaponized-wikileaks-influence-election-american-president/130163/" target="_blank">political nature</a> of this cyberattack means that Democrats and Republicans are trying to spin this as much as possible. Even so, we have to accept that someone is attacking our nation’s computer systems in an apparent attempt to influence a presidential election. This kind of cyberattack targets the very core of our democratic process. And it points to the possibility of an even worse problem in November — that our election systems and our voting machines could be vulnerable to a similar attack.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'>If the intelligence community has indeed ascertained that Russia is to blame, our government needs to decide what to do in response. This is difficult because the attacks are politically partisan, but it <a href="http://arstechnica.com/security/2016/06/guest-editorial-the-dnc-hack-and-dump-is-what-cyberwar-looks-like/" target="_blank">is</a> <a href="https://www.balloon-juice.com/2016/07/26/we-are-at-cyber-war-so-what-exactly-do-we-do-about-it/" target="_blank">essential</a>. If foreign governments learn that they can influence our elections with impunity, this opens the door for <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.com/michael-gregg/top-six-ways-hackers-coul_b_7832730.html" target="_blank">future manipulations</a>, both document thefts and dumps like this one that we see and more subtle manipulations that we don’t see.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'>Retaliation is politically fraught and could have serious consequences, but this is an attack against our democracy. We need to confront Russian President Vladimir Putin in some way — politically, economically or in cyberspace — and make it clear that we will not tolerate this kind of interference by any government. Regardless of your political leanings this time, there’s no guarantee the next country that tries to manipulate our elections will share your preferred candidates.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'>Even more important, we need to secure our election systems before autumn. If Putin’s government has already used a cyberattack to attempt to <a href="http://talkingpointsmemo.com/edblog/trump-putin-yes-it-s-really-a-thing" target="_blank">help Trump win</a>, there’s no reason to believe he won’t do it again — especially now that <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/democratic-national-convention-obama-biden-kaine-set-to-tout-clinton-as-commander-in-chief/2016/07/27/afc57884-53e8-11e6-bbf5-957ad17b4385_story.html?hpid=hp_hp-top-table-main_trump-1230pm%3Ahomepage%2Fstory" target="_blank">Trump is inviting the “help.”</a><o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'>Over the years, more and more states have moved to electronic voting machines and have flirted with Internet voting. These systems <a href="http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2015/04/meet-the-e-voting-machine-so-easy-to-hack-it-will-take-your-breath-away/" target="_blank">are</a> <a href="https://www.statslife.org.uk/significance/politics/2288-how-trustworthy-are-electronic-voting-systems-in-the-us" target="_blank">insecure</a> <a href="https://www.salon.com/2011/09/27/votinghack/" target="_blank">and</a> <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/apr/15/virginia-hacking-voting-machines-security" target="_blank">vulnerable</a> <a href="http://whowhatwhy.org/2015/08/31/foreigners-could-hack-us-elections-experts-say/" target="_blank">to</a> <a href="http://www.popsci.com/gadgets/article/2012-11/how-i-hacked-electronic-voting-machine" target="_blank">attack</a>.<o:p></o:p></p><p><i>[<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2016/03/29/your-iphone-just-got-a-lot-less-secure-and-the-fbi-is-to-blame/" target="_blank">Your iPhone just got less secure. Blame the FBI.</a>] </i><o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'>But while computer security experts <a href="https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2004/11/the_problem_wit.html" target="_blank">like me</a> have <a href="https://www.giac.org/paper/gsec/3687/inherent-problems-electronic-voting-systems/105962" target="_blank">sounded</a> <a href="http://homepage.cs.uiowa.edu/%7Ejones/voting/congress.html" target="_blank">the</a> <a href="https://cs.stanford.edu/people/eroberts/cs181/projects/2006-07/electronic-voting/index_files/page0004.html" target="_blank">alarm</a> <a href="https://citp.princeton.edu/research/voting/" target="_blank">for</a> many years, states have largely ignored the threat, and the machine manufacturers have thrown up enough obfuscating babble that election officials are largely mollified.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'>We <a href="https://scontent.xx.fbcdn.net/hphotos-xlp1/v/t1.0-9/12115815_699872940152206_2266030088084252627_n.png?oh=2a4e5e944a5feadb7e133dd8c57be376&oe=57AD8C92" target="_blank">no longer</a> <a href="https://xkcd.com/463/" target="_blank">have time</a> for that. We must ignore the machine manufacturers’ <a href="https://www.salon.com/2006/09/13/diebold_3/" target="_blank">spurious claims</a> of security, create tiger teams to test the machines’ and systems’ resistance to attack, drastically increase their cyber-defenses and take them offline if we can’t guarantee their security online.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'>Longer term, we need to return to election systems that are secure from manipulation. This means voting machines with <a href="http://votingmachines.procon.org/view.answers.php?questionID=000291" target="_blank">voter-verified paper audit trails</a>, and <a href="http://engineering.jhu.edu/magazine/2016/06/internet-voting-nonstarter/" target="_blank">no</a> <a href="https://www.verifiedvoting.org/resources/internet-voting/vote-online/" target="_blank">Internet</a> <a href="http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=2012-presidential-election-electronic-voting" target="_blank">voting</a>. I know it’s slower and less convenient to stick to the old-fashioned way, but the security risks are simply too great.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'>There are other ways to attack our election system on the Internet besides hacking voting machines or changing vote tallies: <a href="http://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/278231-election-fraud-feared-as-hackers-target-voter-records" target="_blank">deleting voter records</a>, hijacking candidate or party websites, targeting and intimidating campaign workers or donors. There have already been multiple instances of <a href="https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2015/11/the_rise_of_pol.html" target="_blank">political doxing</a> — publishing personal information and documents about a person or organization — and we could easily see more of it in this election cycle. We need to take these risks much more seriously than before.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'>Government interference with foreign elections isn’t new, and in fact, that’s something the United States itself has <a href="https://www.lawfareblog.com/what-old-and-new-and-scary-russias-probable-dnc-hack" target="_blank">repeatedly done</a> in recent history. Using cyberattacks to influence elections is newer but has been done before, too — most notably in <a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/features/2016-how-to-hack-an-election/" target="_blank">Latin America</a>. Hacking of voting machines isn’t new, either. But what is new is a foreign government interfering with a U.S. national election on a large scale. Our democracy cannot tolerate it, and we as citizens cannot accept it.<o:p></o:p></p><p><i>[<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2016/07/26/why-would-russia-interfere-in-the-u-s-election-because-it-usually-works/" target="_blank">Why would Russia try to hack the U.S. election? Because it might work.</a>] </i><o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'>Last April, the Obama administration <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2015/04/01/our-latest-tool-combat-cyber-attacks-what-you-need-know" target="_blank">issued</a> <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2015/04/01/expanding-our-ability-combat-cyber-threats" target="_blank">an</a> <a href="https://medium.com/the-white-house/a-new-tool-against-cyber-threats-1a30c188bc4#.jgbalohyi" target="_blank">executive</a> <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/04/01/executive-order-blocking-property-certain-persons-engaging-significant-m" target="_blank">order</a> outlining how we as a nation respond to cyberattacks against our critical infrastructure. While our election technology was not explicitly mentioned, our political process is certainly critical. And while they’re a hodgepodge of separate state-run systems, together their security affects every one of us. After everyone has voted, it is essential that both sides believe the election was fair and the results accurate. Otherwise, the election has no legitimacy.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'>Election security is now a national security issue; federal officials need to take the lead, and they need to do it quickly.<o:p></o:p></p><div><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'> <o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'> <o:p></o:p></p></div></div></div></div></div></div></blockquote></div></div></div></blockquote></div><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'><br><br clear=all><o:p></o:p></p><div><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'> <o:p></o:p></p></div><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'><span style='color:#888888'>-- <o:p></o:p></span></p><div><div><p class=MsoNormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'><span style='color:#888888'>-- <br><br>Susan Eustis<br>President<br>WinterGreen Research<br>6 Raymond Street<br>Lexington, Massachusetts<br>phone <a href="tel:781%20863%205078" target="_blank">781 863 5078</a><br>cell <a href="tel:617%20852%207876" target="_blank">617 852 7876</a> <o:p></o:p></span></p></div></div></div></div></blockquote></div></div></blockquote></div><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p></div></div><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p></div></div></body></html>