[CAVO] Auditing electronic voting

[Brent Turner]

My understanding is that both the Dechert Design and Dr. Gilbert's Prime
lll qualify as simple and open source.

Hopefully the anticipated SF system will fit that suit ,too.

I do like strong audit capability for the obvious reasons.. but I also
equate " audit -speak " to botched elections..  as it is a past tense
proposition.. rather than " first count " focused..

BT

On Sun, Jun 5, 2016 at 4:57 PM, Lawrence Rosen <lrosen at rosenlaw.com> wrote:

> David Webber wrote:
>
> > With a digital system you want built in verification and auditing.
>
>
>
> Sure. Our credit union had that too! Nothing wrong with letting the system
> check itself also.
>
>
>
> > We just need the State to produce its digital elector registration
> database - ready to be imported into the voting system.  That we can
> provide software to assist with.
>
>
>
> No way! There is no reason for a state to publish a list of voters. As
> long as I get my unique ballot from them just because I'm registered, and I
> can vote it anonymously and electronically, and the process is verified,
> you don't need to publish my name at all. I also pay my taxes without the
> IRS publishing anything! My emails with the IRS are private.
>
>
>
> Since this CAVO list was created, I've been bothered that we're trying to
> create some *grand*, secure, open source voting system that will
> magically replace the current system. NO. That's not my goal. I want a
> *simple*, secure, open source voting system, no magic required, to allow
> more people to vote without paper ballots stuffed into boxes and scanned by
> proprietary machines.
>
>
>
> I can register the copyright for that elections software with the Library
> of Congress with a simple online transaction. But you won't let me run it
> without three levels of independent record in every county elections
> office. That's over-kill.
>
>
>
> /Larry
>
>
>
>
>
> *From:* David RR Webber (XML) [mailto:david at drrw.info]
> *Sent:* Sunday, June 5, 2016 4:06 PM
> *To:* CAVO <cavo at opensource.org>
> *Subject:* Re: [CAVO] Auditing electronic voting
>
>
>
> Larry,
>
>
>
> All those same statistical tools are in play for election results
> "auditing" today that States perform and hire independent experts to
> perform.
>
>
>
> I don't like any of them.  It's too much fishing and hoping.
>
>
>
> With a digital system you want built in verification and auditing.
>
>
>
> That is why I mentioned 3 independent systems of record.
>
>
>
> Now imagine (sigh I hate all these financial system comparisons - but what
> the) that your Credit Union accounts had 3 systems of record - one
> internally, a second held by the State, and a third held by an independent
> 3rd party (non-profit service provider).  Transactions are triple blind
> integrated into each system and mirrored.
>
>
>
> Now if someone is doing something shady - they have to corrupt all three
> systems - not just one.
>
>
>
> You want all 3 systems to agree on balance totals. You run a batch query
> against all accounts once a month (or more). If not - you audit to find out
> why.  Notice this is much more effective than annual guessing - by which
> time the digital horse could have left 100 barns not just 1!
>
>
>
> BTW - money laundering is not detected by your annual audit either - in
> this case money is deposited in one State - then withdrawn in another
> routinely.  This would be akin to ballot stuffing.
>
>
>
> I'm glad you were reassured by the annual hand-holding exercise at your
> Credit Union - frankly I view that as pure window dressing and legal
> liability avoidance.  Oh we lost your money? Sorry, but we have all these
> safeguards (cough worthless) in place but it looks and sounds great.
> Welcome to America.
>
>
>
> Cheers, David
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> -------- Original Message --------
> Subject: [CAVO] Auditing electronic voting
> From: "Lawrence Rosen" <lrosen at rosenlaw.com>
> Date: Sun, June 05, 2016 3:05 pm
> To: "'CAVO'" <cavo at opensource.org>
> Cc: Lawrence Rosen <lrosen at rosenlaw.com>
>
> Sometime after an election, before the votes are certified or perhaps only
> after a candidate has raised an express challenge to the posted results,
> electronic voting systems will need to be audited by an independent agency.
>
>
>
> I was once chair of a federal credit union whose tens of thousands of
> accounts needed to be audited every year. That required sampling and
> confirmation procedures by a federal auditor. That required intelligent
> comparisons between cash deposited and cash distributed. And random credit
> union members were asked specifically – by the auditor – to verify their
> bank balances by comparing the credit union's records to their own. (This
> is like randomly comparing a voter's printed ballot with the vote actually
> counted.) The auditors had account numbers to work with, not personal names
> or individual wealth/poverty data. Even we board members didn't have access
> to individual account data.
>
>
>
> This was a required process. It was local, in our own offices. It was
> relatively brief every year. And it was thorough and reassuring to
> everyone. But it wasn't rocket science.
>
>
>
> /Larry
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
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