[CAVO] Fwd: CAVO draft - response to LAFCO draft - Please comment

[Brent Turner]

Please comment -
---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: Brent Turner <brent at trealestate.net>
Date: Sun, May 31, 2015 at 1:50 PM
Subject: CAVO draft - response to LAFCO draft - Please comment
To: Brent Turner <turnerbrentm at gmail.com>


CAVO comments and points of clarification -

1. Page 5 Section 2 " Introduction" - Paragraph 3 . " To best provide
empirical evidence for the purpose of this study, LAFCo examined numerous
reports regarding open source election software, existing proprietary
voting systems, and *current open source voting system projects elsewhere
in the nation**;-*

and

2. Page 6 Section 3- " Executive Summary " Paragraph 2* -While there is no
complete open source voting system in place anywhere in the country, two *
counties are in the process of developing their own open source voting
system: Los Angeles County, California, and Travis County, Texas.

*It should be noted that this apparent and literal reference to Travis
County, Texas and Los Angeles County, California should be clarified as
those projects  are not yet confirmed as open source.  Microsoft's
involvement with the Texas project, and OSET's involvement with the Los
Angeles project, coupled with the project leaders failure to announce the
specifics of the intended code, has led many experts to predict  the
systems will not be utilizing open source, as defined by Open Source
Initiative. *

3. Page 6/ Section 3 " Executive Summary " Paragraph 3 / - Bullet point 3
*While no one can reasonably claim that open source would be more secure
than proprietary systems*, advocates are firm in expressing open source
software and technology is not inherently less secure than closed source
software.

Page 25-  Paragraph 2 - It is important to note that LAFCo nor any of the
experts interviewed for this report are claiming that open source software
is more secure than closed source software; *there is no possible way to
make that claim*. To this point, however, the experts interviewed for this
report stressed that open source software can be just as secure as closed
source software, and dispute the notion that open source software is more
vulnerable to attacks and tampering. Furthermore, proponents of the new
system state the transparent nature of open source software could allow
more eyes to spot any problems or evidence of tampering as opposed to
closed source software.

*It should be noted that the use of open source CAN  in fact be reasonably
claimed as creating a more secure environment for vote tabulation systems.
This is not to state open source is a " panacea " toward security, but
rather a necessary component inher**ent to the foundation of best security
practices for voting systems. Certainly a smaller amount of more elegant
code, with more " eyes on the code " and oversight of that code, may be
argued as creating a better security environment
                                                                          *
4. Page 7 / Section 3 " Executive Summary " Paragraph 3 / Bullet Point 6

The development of open source voting systems takes a considerable amount
of time, money, and effort, *most of which is undeterminable at this point.*


*It should be noted that the word " undeterminable " should be revised to "
undetermined " with the understanding the range of expense has been
calculated by experts to be approximately 4 million dollars for a certified
open source system. It should also be noted  a more concise calculation is
quickly obtainable at minimal expense .      *

5. Page 12 / Paragraph 3  " Contracting with an external company "

*OSET has already developed parts of the voting process that are open
source*—voter registration,for example—and aims to complete the development
of ballot printers and tabulators next.

*It should be noted that the license announced by OSET as " Open Public
License " does not meet the definition of open source as set forth by Open
Source Initiative           *

6.  Page 28 " Concluding remarks " paragraph 3

LA County spent $150,000 for initial research, *and another $15 million
with IDEO to create the design of the ballot*. If the CCSF draws upon their
research and model, they would not need to spend as much in those
areas—ideally,

*It should be noted that the 15m dollar " design " contract has been
considered by many experts as " prima facie " exorbitant as in fact
 lacking available deliverables, and may not be representative of an
appropriate cost-measure. Also it should be noted the contract price  was
quite possibly the result  of the " no-bid / sole source" nature of the
contract      *

 7. Page 29 " Concluding remarks"  Paragraph 3

*Additionally, although CAVO is eager to develop the system for the CCSF*,
we recommend putting out a RFI in order to expand the CCSF’s options (if
the CCSF decides to create an open source voting system). The San
Francisco/Bay Area is home to a plethora of tech companies, providing a
wide range of options and valuable resources to develop the most effective
open source voting system.

*It should be noted that CAVO is "available " to " develop "  or oversee
the development of the CCSF system, rather than " eager " ,  and operates
out of civic  duty rather than  business strategy.    An RFI is in keeping
with the CAVO plan, which has been tendered as a catalyst for  the purpose
of open source voting systems.  CAVO's position is to provide risk
management and quality assurance as San Francisco moves forward in leading
the state and country toward more secure and affordable voting systems
                                                              *
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.opensource.org/pipermail/cavo_lists.opensource.org/attachments/20150531/99495a92/attachment.html>